Local and global: mesogovernments and territorial identities by Moreno, Luis
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (CSIC) 
Working Paper 98-09 
Local and global: mesogovernments and territorial identities 
Luis Moreno 
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados 
Abstract 
At the turn of the millenium, new telecommunications are shaping social life worldwide in a
far-reaching manner. Impacts associated with these technological developments affect both
economic globalization and territorial identities. These latter trends, apparently
contradictory, bring with them elements of rapid social change and uncertainty. This paper
reflects on the conjunction of both dimensions of the local and the global, and carries out a
prescription of the progressive consolidation of a new cosmopolitan localism within the
meso-level of community life.  
A theoretical review of concepts such as multiple identities or territorial accommodation
serves as an introduction to the subsequent discussion on the effects of globalization, the
extension of market values, and the loss of power by the nation states. A critical digression
on the diffusionist, functionalist, and neoinstitutionalist approaches seeks to illustrate some
conceptual misunderstandings regarding identity and territory.  
Mesogovernments no longer depend upon the rationalizing actions taken by central
bureaucracies and élites within national arenas. At present, some minority nations, small
nation-states, regions and conurbations appear to be better equipped to maximize the
impacts associated with downward and upward developments. These relate to global action
and local identities, respectively. References made to the European context seek to
illustrate how the interaction of multiple identities makes possible a more effective access of
civil society to the process of decision-making. This process finds its expression at various
political and institutional levels within the wider framework of transnational europeanization. 
This paper deals primarily with the interaction between the local and the global, the revival 
of territorial identities, and the increasing incidence of the meso-level in contemporary life. 
The focus on territoriality should not be considered as the neglect of other forms of societal 
identities also affected by globalization. However, our main area of analysis concerns 
identity and territory. 
At the turn of the millenium, citizens face a situation of advanced modernity with some 
perplexity. They have discovered new horizons in the understanding of their own collective 
and individual life within a climate of uncertainty and rapid change. To a large extent, all 
these transformations have been made possible by the telecommunications revolution.  
Nowadays, individuals and groups have immediate access to a wide range of endless data, 
information, and news generated in the remotest corners in the earth. The integrated 
networks of personal computers, TV terminals, and Web servers allow for a reciprocal and 
fluid communication between the house or workplace and the multifaceted external world
[1]. One consequence of these technological developments is the higher degree of 
democratization in the processes of dissemination and exchange of information.  
A myriad of facts, including those related to cultures and collectives all over the world are 
now available to the general public. The ‘digestion’ of such avalanches of information 
increasingly conditions economic, political, and social activities. The restriction of 
information and representation images characteristic of power practices in the past has 
been progressively replaced by the efficient management of overwhelming masses of 
information produced swiftly and without restraint.  
In parallel, the growing attachment of citizens to communities at local and meso-level is 
also noticeable, particularly in Europe. Such communities are of rather analogous socio-
economic characteristics and are politically situated in a somewhat equidistant position 
between the nation-state (or multinational state), and other transnational bodies and 
institutions (EU, GATT, G-7, IMF, NAFTA, WB, WTO). Territorial identities associated with 
these communities have provided new political underpinnings for citizens and groups.  
The drive towards rebuilding relationships between the in- and out-spheres of human 
existence is shaped by citizens’ internalization of practicalities and values related to a 
global context affecting matters of everyday life. Identities are in the midst of such a 
process of re-definition, with crucial derivations for political culture, social mobilization, and 
political institutions. The most important factor in all aspects of globalization can be 
considered as perceptive (Strange, 1995). Interpretations claiming that a blurring of local 
markers would follow the globalizing trends should nevertheless be qualified. In fact, we are 
witnessing a reinforcement of community identities at the sub-state level, a trend 
counteracting the simple assumption of a dehumanizing and undemocratic Brave New 
World.  
Attachments to supranational identities should also be accounted for, as the process of 
europeanization clearly shows. This multiplicity of identities is reflected in the way that 
electors cast their votes. Therefore, patterns of electoral behavior should be regarded not 
only as the result of a combination of ideological offerings, party programs and leadership, 
but also as the manifestation of ‘tactical voting’ depending on the territoriality related to the 
election (municipal, regional, national, supranational). 
In the first section of this paper a conceptual review of ideas and theoretical assumptions is 
carried out. Ethnoterritoriality, collective identities, and the territorial accommodation in 
plural societies are among the concepts analyzed. A critical digression of diffusionist, 
functionalist, and neoinstitutionalist approaches seeks to emphasize the relevance of 
territoriality in contemporary conflicts around the world. In the second section, a reflection 
on the implications of globalization, the extension of market values, and the relative loss of 
power and influence by the nation-state is put forward. The last section of this paper 
focuses on the growing role played by those meso-communities in Europe which have been 
able to make the general and the particular compatible. This development seems to be in 
line with a trend towards what can be labeled as a new cosmopolitan localism.  
Premises and concepts 
At present, all-embracing and exclusive identities are openly questioned and have become 
problematic. While being corroded by the forces of globalization they are also subject to 
fragmentation, competition and overlapping elements of a multiple and diverse nature. The 
discontinuity and dislocation of social arrangements enable diverse identities —particularly, 
territorial— to relate to each other in quite an unpredictable manner. In fact, identities are 
shared in various degrees by individuals and are subject to constant internalization by 
group members (Melucci, 1989; Giddens, 1991; Smith, 1991; Greenfeld, 1992).  
A considerable problem arises when establishing boundaries and degrees of citizens’ self-
identification, and on interpreting the causes for political mobilization related to territorial 
identities. As pointed out earlier, a strengthening of meso-level identities goes hand in hand 
with a growing attachment to supranational levels of civic membership and institutional 
development. The process of europeanization seems to conciliate adequately 
supranational, state and local identities in apparent conflict among themselves[2]. 
In this paper we deal primarily with the concept of ethnoterritoriality, which refers to a 
dimension where conflicts and political mobilizations are developed and have as their chief 
social actors those ethnic groups which possess a geographical underpinning. Such a 
spatial reference is identifiable within the boundaries of a polity, usually of a compound or 
plural composition (Moreno, 1986; Rudolph and Thompson, 1992; Coakley, 1994). 
In plural societies individuals are tied to cultural reference groups which might be in 
competition among themselves (Barth, 1969). This results in a multiplicity of dynamic and 
often shared socio-political identities, which are not necessarily expressed explicitly. 
Therefore, identity markers are malleable, and the intensity of their manifestation greatly 
depends upon contingent circumstances (Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Brass, 1991; 
Cohen, 1992;).  
The revival of ethnoterritorial political movements in the Western world has coincided with 
an increasing challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state. Within the European 
context, Spain offers a good example of how regional devolution and federalization seek to 
articulate a response to the stimuli of the diversity of society. This plurality comprises 
cultural/ethnic groups with differences of language, history and traditions, which can also be 
reflected in the party system (Moreno, 1997a/b)[3].  
Citizens in multinational states in Europe incorporate in variable proportions, both 
local/ethnoterritorial and state/national identities. The degree of internal consent and 
dissent in these plural polities has in the concept of dual identity a useful methodological 
tool for socio-political interpretations[4]. 
Indeed, the quest for self-government by meso-level communities is in full accordance with 
the variable manifestation of such duality in citizens’ self-identification: the more the 
primordial ethnoterritorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the 
demands for political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterized the state-national 
identity is, the less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflicts to appear. At the extreme, 
complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a socio-political 
fracture in the pluriethnic state, and demands for self-government would probably take the 
form of independence. In other words, when citizens in a sub-state community identify 
themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional outcome of such antagonism will also 
tend to be exclusive. 
This papers sustains the view that ethnoterritorial co-operation and agreement may not only 
overcome conflicts and divergence within plural polities, but can also provide a deepening 
of democracy by means of favoring the participation of citizens at all possible levels of 
institutional life and political decision-making. Such developments usually fit better in 
multinational polities where internal ethnoterritorial and cultural diversity are politicized[5]. 
Diffusionism, functionalism, neoinstitutionalism  
The social sciences have also been exposed to the effects brought about by the 
informational revolution. Changes generated by globalization have underlined the 
obsolescence of a good deal of their analytical, conceptual, and methodological tools. Let 
us remember, however, that during the last decades the contributions of some social 
scientists created no little confusion when reflecting on socio-political rights and territorial 
identities. In this section a critical digression on some of these misunderstandings aims to 
clarify certain factors relevant to the European context.  
The influential theories developed by some North-American social scientists have 
frequently concentrated on the description and prescription of social categories having as 
referential contexts those of the USA and Canada. Some of these approaches —with 
universalistic pretensions— have impinged upon interpretations made by other academics 
around the world in a rather spurious manner.  
Functional diffusionism, in particular, has persistently conveyed the idea that internal 
territorial differences within nation states would disappear with the extension of liberal 
democracy and industrial capitalism. As communication of political, economic and cultural 
matters increased, the peoples of different regions would develop a new common identity, 
which would transcend their differences (Deutsch, 1966)[6]. Society would became 
‘modernized’ by means of elite-initiated policies aimed at achieving social standardization 
(e.g. common language and citizenship). As a consequence, the cultural identities of ethnic 
groups and minorities would be replaced by a set of class-orientated conflicts, or conflicts 
among interest groups. Thus, modernization was regarded to have brought about the idea 
of an all-embracing state national identity rooted in both cultural and civic axes. History has 
repeatedly falsified such analyses[7]. 
Likewise, it has been argued that political accommodation to secure political and 
institutional stability in pluriethnic societies or polyarchies is almost impossible. 
Furthermore, attempts made to achieve such a goal are bound to result in either the break-
up of the state or the consolidation of a type of hegemonic authoritarianism for the control 
of the state's unity (Dahl, 1971; Horowitz, 1985)[8]. Contemporary liberal thinkers have 
greatly revitalized the debate regarding individual and collective rights. Most of them can be 
labeled ‘liberal nationalists’ (Tamir, 1993). Some have argued persuasively for the case of 
multiculturalism and the politics of recognition for minorities. However, some of their 
normative analyses insist upon the unfeasibility of accommodating ethnonational groups 
within federations –as the case of Quebec and Canada would illustrate[9]. 
Advocates of the American School of Comparative Politics had interpreted that the 
processes of periphery migrations into the urbanized core areas would eliminate the old 
local ascribing identities in favor of new associative links of a functional nature. Some of 
these theses advanced by Talcott Parsons y Karl Deutsch were often accepted uncritically 
and rather dogmatically. Thus, many North-American social scientists have adopted the 
view that universal progress requires a kind of assimilationist integration, which implied 
inclusive social systems and the practices of de-tribalization[10]. As a corollary to this 
normative analysis there was a course of action aiming at achieving an advanced type of 
modern society in the USA. This was to be offered as a model of reference to the rest of the 
world. 
According to such premises the idea of the melting pot was identified as reflecting the very 
idea of assimilating immigrant groups into a common national identity[11]. The Americans 
were to be the end product of a process of social hybridization by which the various ethnic 
groups were to be dissolved in a superior category of citizens freed from previous identities. 
However, the ‘new’ Americans have continued to preserve attachments in various degrees 
and manners to their identities of reference (Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, Germanic, Hispanic, 
Italian, Jewish, Slavic, or South-Asian, to name some of them). The reality was that 
assimilationist integration was carried out according to WASP patterns, with occasional 
influxes from Italian and Jewish/Yiddish immigrant cultures (Safran, 1987). 
In the 1960s Glazer and Moynihan (1963) were already questioning the very nature of the 
melting pot in the USA. In their study on the city of New York, they concluded that prejudice 
and discrimination among descendents of Afro-Americans, Jewish, Irish, Italians, or Puerto-
Ricans were more noticeable than their common features as American citizens[12]. Ethnic 
groups were regarded as interest groups with identity cohesion who were ready to engage 
in resource competition with other ethnic groups in plural US society. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the cultural pluralist school of thought proposed that the 
melting pot was rather a salad bowl. In this new container the ingredients (ethnic groups) 
were to maintain their appearance and distinctiveness. Such an approach was to pave the 
way for the subsequent development of the multiculturalist theses. The object of study of 
this new approach to ethnic relations was Canada and the USA, societies formed by 
immigrant groups. 
The attempt made by multiculturalism to articulate diverse identities in advanced 
democratic societies has aimed at the recognition of the rights of minority groups, and in 
particular their own societal cultures[13]. Notwithstanding, this declaration of minority rights 
carries implicitly a different kind of assimilationist program. Ethnic differences are to be 
articulated within the majority societal culture of the Anglo-Saxon group, and are dependent 
upon the acceptance of American English as the citizens’ compulsory lingua franca[14]. 
Policies of affirmative action seek to implement positive discrimination programs in favor of 
less-privileged minority groups. Among others, it refers to ethnic groups such as Afro-
American, American Indians and Latinos. Although aiming at providing a level of full 
economic, political, and social rights to the discriminated members of minority ethnic 
groups, a degree of ‘Anglo conformity’ is assumed on accepting the benefits of such 
policies granted (Kymlicka, 1995). Accordingly, civic-ethnocultural dichotomy is difficult to 
reconcile due to an understanding of the integration process as merely instrumental. This is 
aimed at preserving the dominant position of the majority societal culture, and the 
standardized means of achieving social cohesion (language, codes of conduct, values of 
social exchange)[15]. As a result, multicultural attempts are ambivalent and condition a 
sincere and mutual recognition of distinct collective identities (Taylor, 1997). 
The refutation of theories and the analysis of complex political developments have 
stimulated social scientists to elaborate new frameworks for the understanding and 
explanation of contemporary social life. Neoinstitutionalism can be regarded as an 
approach aimed at a conceptual and analytical aggiornamento carried out mainly by North-
American academics. There are three main variants within this school of thought: 
sociological, rational choice, and historical. All three share the view that institutions shape 
the preferences and objectives of social actors in their decision-making processes. 
Furthermore, they argue that through the establishment of the ‘game rules’ of power and 
influence, institutions also condition decisively the outcomes of such decisions (Koelble, 
1995).  
The enthusiasm shown by many European social scientists for the neoinstitutionalist theses 
is remarkable. Let us, however, acknowledge the fact that in the Old Continent institutions 
have secularly shaped decisions and identities, and vice-versa. This has been somewhat 
different in the case the New Continent, a fact that greatly explains the importance given by 
this new school of thought to the paramount role to be played by the institutions. Other 
routes for further research should be encouraged. For example, much explanatory work 
needs to be accomplished for the understanding of the mechanisms of interaction between 
human affinities and institutions. On explaining ethnoterritorial mobilization the dilemma 
between reasons and emotions reaches a level of inextricable categorical and conceptual 
de-construction. The reference to institutions as important sources for determining 
collective expectations and choices is useful but insufficient. Phenomena affecting ethnic 
relations are often a-rational. Groups with territorial identities are actors that do not 
necessarily behave according to any pre-determined institutional logic. Group solidarity and 
self-perception of comparative grievances, for instance, can be identified as powerful 
instruments for mobilization without any objective reasons based on empirical evidence or 
any particular pattern of institutional design[16].  
Globalization, market values and the nation-state 
At a time when certain universal visions of human existence seemed to indicate a fusion of 
both individuality and globality, group specifities have returned to the fore as the main 
protagonists of social life. Other alternative views have envisaged a process of transit to a 
post-modern relativism. All things considered, citizens around the world are working to 
revive old particularities and communal roots. In this way spatial references multiply so that 
their social existence can be legitimized through a re-assertion of collective identities.  
Ethnic myths and group affiliations continue to offer a substratum for the management of 
individual anxieties and aspirations. In particular, European societies seem to reinforce 
secular ties of integration within the family[17], or to recreate medium-sized political 
communities as was the case in the early Modern Age[18]. 
However, divergent effects resulting from the gradual configuration of the global village 
advanced by Marshall McLuhan can be observed. In the first place, the globalization and 
internationalization of trade encouraged by the telecommunication revolution are decisively 
affecting the economy worldwide, and have brought about a deep restructuring of 
contemporary capitalism. Other related developments have led some authors to point out 
that we are witnessing the emergence of a net society characterized by the exchange of 
transactions of an informational nature (Castells, 1997).  
Indeed, the constitution of a world market for communication schemes has been 
spectacular in recent times (NB. Between 1984 and 1995 it increased five-fold). At the 
beginning of 1996 there were 15 phone companies with revenues over US$10,000 per 
year, an amount higher than the annual budgets of most small nation-states around the 
world. Furthermore, the use of new systems of inter-personal communication, such as 
electronic mail, has become almost universal in areas like the academic sector. 
The Internet and the World Wide Web have become part of everyday life. Their presence is 
evident not only in corporate and professional realms, but also as regards a wide range of 
leisure activities. The younger generation is increasingly adopting new lifestyles, which are 
greatly influenced by the use of hypertext software for personal computers and related 
developments[19]. Obviously, this informational advance reproduces the traditional dualities 
of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, but access to the new telecommunications is not confined to a 
few. In fact, the consumption costs are affordable to the majority of users. Easy 
accessibility and availability have greatly contributed to the dissemination of all kinds of 
information. 
The other visible side of the coin concerning our discussion relates to territorial identities, 
the political aspirations for political autonomy of medium-sized communities, and the 
relative obsolescence of the nation-state as the central arena for economic, political, and 
social life. In fact, the nation-state can be regarded as just another actor —on many 
occasions with a supporting or secondary role— in what some authors have labeled the 
New World Order, Inc. (Schmidt, 1995). Often, its passivity turns into inefficacy when 
dealing with transnational criminal rackets. These groups are well suited operating at 
international level and are able to maximize the inability of individual nation-states to clamp 
down on organized crime[20].  
At present, national economic policies are becoming more and more dependent on external 
factors and constraints beyond their control. But geographical mobility does not solely affect 
capital flows. Other production factors are also concerned, such as industrial components 
and parts manufactured in cheap-labor countries and imported subsequently for 
assembling, marketing, and sale in core industrial countries. International freight and a 
legion of stateless managers are other factors which are becoming increasingly 
transnational[21]. 
Globalization has meant a transfer of authority and power from the nation-states to the 
markets. The very patterns of economic competition are to comply with the new rules of 
global markets and the strategies of transnational corporations. Some authors are of the 
opinion that global capitalism is deprived of any sense of territoriality. On selecting locations 
for investment, analysts consider first and foremost the level of profit that they expect to 
achieve. Indeed, they have a much wider perspective than that determined by purely 
national interests[22]. But there are other crucial elements related to levels of social 
cohesion, the absence of political turmoil, or the stability of the institutions of the candidate 
countries which also need to be assessed. Other cultural aspects, such as educational 
systems or national languages are important too[23]. Furthermore, the processes of 
decision-making for investments are greatly exposed to the input made by the media and 
opinion leaders, neither of which can be considered territorially ‘neutral’. 
National governments still maintain their nominal sovereignty empowering them to 
negotiate new economic frameworks (MERCOSUR, NAFTA, UEM, or WTO). At the same 
time they also bargain with the transnational corporations. Their economic maneuvering to 
put forward innovative polices outside global demands is rather limited. The case of the 
programs for indicative planning implemented by the first Mitterrand Government in the 
early 1980s was symptomatic of the external constraints posed on the national sovereignty 
in the most statist country in Europe. 
French Governments after the Second World War put into action plans for economic 
growth. These were to be implemented in a hierarchical manner by the powerful French 
public sector, and were ‘indicative’ of the industrial priorities to be taken by private 
businesses. They set economic guidelines for the general development of the country. The 
model worked satisfactorily in the post-war period allowing the French economy to perform 
at a good level[24]. Right after the Socialist victory in the 1981 General Election the Mauroy 
Government attempted a different path away from the policies of economic austerity 
followed by the neighboring European countries. The aim was to overcome the effects of 
the lower stages of the economic cycle by means of implementing Neo-Keynesian 
programs of re-activation. The experience ended in failure. In those years the majority of 
European countries had opted for programs of austerity and a tight control of their national 
deficits. International financial markets had overwhelmingly validated these measures. Not 
long after their initial implementation French economic policies suffered a Copernican turn 
and were to align themselves with the course of action taken by the rest of Europe.  
Together with the limits posed upon nation-states’ sovereignty by the internationalization of 
the financial markets, the regions and large cities have also exerted pressure on central 
governments for decentralization and autonomy. Both actions are having great 
repercussions on the power of the nation-state. Frequently, sub-state mesogovernments 
and local authorities do not require the rationalizing intervention of central bureaucracies 
and élites. In fact, the rules of the New World Order, Inc. often directly concern the action 
and policies of these sub-state layers of governments. They can activate policies of 
industrial relocation or attraction of foreign capitals without the role of the intermediaries at 
the state’s center. By means of local incentives, urban re-development plans, or favoring 
corporatist agreements with trade unions and industrialists, mesogovernments and 
metropolitan authorities can have direct negotiations with the transnational corporations 
involved. 
Mesogovernments as actors of political mobilization 
 Given this context of internationalization, the role played by medium-size polities is 
acquiring relevance in most aspects of contemporary life. The renewal of community life at 
the meso-level derives mainly from the combination of two main factors: a growing rejection 
of centralization in unitary states coupled with a strengthening of supranational politics, and 
a reinforcement of local identities and societal cultures with an territorial underpinning.  
Mesogovernments are no longer dependent on the state building programs of 
rationalization carried out during the XIX and XX centuries. Their own entrepreneurs, social 
leaders and local intelligentsia have adopted many of the initiatives and roles once 
reserved for ‘enlightened’ élites, who in the past held the reins of power at the center of 
their nation states. Positions of influence are now more evenly distributed in central, meso-
level and local institutions. The co-option of regional elites to the central institutions of 
government are no longer the exclusive routes available to ‘successful’ political careers. 
The supranational framework provided by the European process of convergence brings 
with it a ‘new’ element of further cosmopolitanism to meso-communities and conurbations. 
At one point, and in the face of hard economic competition from other world regions, the 
very idea of a ‘fortress Europe’ was proposed by some analysts. According to this view, the 
secession from the international world arena would preserve the maintenance of the 
European welfare regimes. An economic ‘wall’ around EU member states would guarantee 
the social rights achieved by generations of Europeans. It would also stimulate a balanced 
growth, which, in turn, would create new employment coupled with job-sharing and the 
reduction of working time. Immigration would be tightly regulated. Undoubtedly this option 
would mean a U-turn in the cosmopolitan approach of the European culture and a de-
naturalizing change in its value-system. Besides, the current level of europeanization 
makes the establishment of a strategy for achieving a monolithic autarchy unfeasible. Thus, 
the very idea of a ‘fortress Europe’ cannot be embraced as a workable scheme. 
What is acquiring major relevance in the political life of Europe is the role of sub-state 
communities. Among others, two factors can be identified as having greatly contributed to 
enhance their significance: (a) The re-assertion of territorial identities, and (b) The 
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. Let us briefly review both elements: 
(a) The reinforcement of local identities has provided civil societies with a more participative 
and active role. Examples in Western Europe do not circumscribe to electoral deviations 
from national patterns (CiU-Catalonia, CSU-Baviera, Lega-Northern Italy, SNP-Scotland). 
Social movements and local entrepreneurs have found a more flexible context for action. 
Central state apparatuses are often clumsy and inefficient in dealing with bottom-up 
initiatives. Thus, conurbations and metropolitan areas are well equipped for some 
innovation policies in a more adaptable context to the changing needs laid down by the 
Information Age. The region of Brussels, Metropolitan Madrid, Greater London, and Paris 
and its urban satellites, are re-creating local civic cultures alongside their cosmopolitan 
traditions. Despite the lack of single identities or ethnic uniformities, these conurbations are 
in a similar position to the meso-communities as regards running their own affairs, and 
developing their potentialities outside the dirigiste control of the central state institutions[25].
Many signs seem to point towards the rise of a European type of communitarianism, which 
should be regarded in quite a distinct fashion from that prescribed in North America for local 
communities (Etzioni, 1993). In the case of the USA, many of the communitarian 
experiences may be regarded as reactions to specific social cleavages and pressing social 
fractures (the criminalization of social life), as an instrumental means of socialization in 
response to urban constriction (suburban isolationism), or as alternative lifestyles to 
dominant values (possessive individualism). Thus, North-American communitarianism can 
be seen mainly as socially defensive[26].  
In the EU, territorial identities are mainly pro-active. They are not mere mechanisms of 
response for controlling the informational avalanche generated by the telecommunications 
revolution. The reinforcement of sub-state territorial identities is deeply associated with 
powerful material and symbolic referents of the past (culture, history, territories). They 
seem to have engaged in a process of innovation departing from a common ground, and 
which seeks to overcome the de-naturalizing effects of global hypermodernity[27]. 
However, their manifestations do not take refuge in a reactive parochialism. They emerge, 
therefore, as ‘project identities’ characterized by pro-active attitudes[28]. 
(b) The principle of subsidiarity was enshrined in the Treaty of European Union of 1992, 
known as the Treaty of Maastricht. It provides for decisions to be taken transnationally only 
if local, regional or national levels cannot perform better. In other words, the preferred locus 
for decision-making is that closer to the citizen, and as local as possible. State political 
elites, reluctant to further the process of European institutionalization, interpreted the 
subsidiarity principle as a safeguard for the preservation of traditional national sovereignty 
and, consequently, the powers to intervene centrally. The case of the United Kingdom is 
paradigmatic in this respect. According to such interpretations, the legislative supremacy of 
Westminster would be preserved from supranational intervention and regulation originated 
at the ‘federal’ institutions of the European Union. However, the devolution of power from 
the center of the British state to the constituent nations of the UK, and to amalgamated 
local authorities like the former Greater Council of London, could not be denied taking into 
account the same argumentative grounds.  
The rationale implicit in the principle of subsidiarity favors the participation of sub-state 
layer of governments in the running of public affairs, although global ones are also 
included. At the same time, it will encourage intergovernmental co-operation on the 
assumption that the role of the national states would be less hierarchical than its has been 
up until now. Territorial identities would be intertwined in a manner that would express the 
degrees of citizens’ loyalties towards the various sources of political legitimization: 
municipalities, regions, nations, states, and European Union. Accountability and territorial 
institutions would therefore reflect the political expression of people’s identities and 
democratic participation.  
Immigration from non-EU countries has certainly had an impact on the growing feelings of 
xenophobia in Europe. Nevertheless, immigrants who are willing to take on those values of 
civic pluralism and tolerance find no major difficulty of integration in the economic and 
social life at their first ‘port of entry’, i.e. local and meso-communities. 
Conclusion: a new cosmopolitan localism 
The processes of bottom-up transnationalization and top-down devolution of powers have 
allowed a considerable extension of a type of European cosmopolitan localism. This is 
reflected in both societal interests, which are aimed at developing a sense of local 
community and at participating simultaneously in the international context. There is, thus, a 
growing adjustment between the particular and the general. 
European cosmopolitan localism mainly concerns medium-sized polities within or without 
the framework of a state. Thus, it can be detected in minority nations (Catalonia, Scotland), 
small nation-states (Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovenia), but also in regions and 
metropolitan areas (Languedoc, Brussels, Berlin, Milan). The latter, in particular, seem to 
follow a pattern of re-creating those political communities which flourished in the age prior 
to the New World discoveries (Italian city-states, Hanseatic League, principalities). 
However, and in contrast with the Renaissance period, there is now a common institutional 
tie inherent in the process of europeanization. The majority of the EU peoples have 
internalized European institutions, albeit rather loosely and gradually. The European Court 
of Justice and the Schengen Agreement can be regarded as steps advancing firmly 
towards the very idea of European transnationalization. Even areas such as those 
concerning social policy and welfare development —the traditional domain of national 
intervention— are viewed gradually from a supranational perspective (Deacon et al, 1997). 
Needless to say, all these processes in Europe are taking place in a period of relatively 
stable economic growth characterized by the absence of wars between the once powerful 
colonial nation-states. Some authors hold the view that together with globalization the 
potential for a pessimistic scenario is just around the corner. The ever-latent possibility of 
rivalries between the nation-states, trade conflicts between world regions, or the growth of 
religious fundamentalism and xenophobia are potentially explosive (Chomsky, 1994). 
Alternatively, a move towards a new form of civilization capable of revitalizing the old 
federalist congruence between unity and diversity by means of political pacts appears to be 
a reasonable challenge for this emerging cosmopolitan localism. 
Notes 
1 Immanuel Wallerstein, pioneer in putting forward the world-system approach that emphasizes a global rather 
that a state-centric perspective (1974), has underlined the growing importance of households as ‘part and 
parcel’ of the world economy, as a basic units of production (Wallerstein, 1984).  
2 Some authors are of the opinion that despite the fact that two identities can be referred to a larger entity it 
does not preclude their possible relationship of incompatibility (Pérez Agote, 1994: 311). That would be the 
case, for example, of both Basque and Spanish exclusive forms of self-identification However, the subsuming 
of those identities under the European confines implies a nexus –even though it is not explicitly sought— of 
congruence between both exclusive forms of self-identification.  
3 The persistence of a dual identity or compound nationality in Spain is indicative of their internal 
ethnoterritorial relations. According to Juan Linz, "Spain ... is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a 
large part of the Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities" (1975: 423).  
4 The example of Spain is illustrative. In all seventeen Spanish Comunidades Autónomas (regions and 
nationalities) there is a high proportion of citizens who claim some form of dual identity. The question 
addressed to them in the successive polls was as follows: ‘In general, would you say that you feel...(1) ‘Only 
Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; (2) ‘More Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc. than Spanish’; (3) ‘As much 
Andalusian, Basque, Catalan as Spanish’; (4) ‘More Spanish than Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; or (5) 
‘Only Spanish’. In the period October 1990-June 1995 a degree of duality was expressed by around 70 per 
cent of the total Spanish population (i.e. categories 2, 3 and 4). Approximately 30 per cent of all Spaniards 
expressed a single identity (‘Only Spanish’, or ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’). For an analysis of 
the case of Catalonia see Moreno and Arriba (1996), and Moreno, Arriba and Serrano (1998).  
5 For an analysis of the model of ‘multiple ethnoterrritorial concurrence’ in the case of Spain, see Moreno 
(1995).  
6 For William Safran, one of the prominent characteristics of American social science in general, and the 
behaviorist-functionalist school of political science in particular, is its ahistoricist bias. History is rejected on 
two grounds: "First...as a succession of events that…do not lend themselves to comparison and 
generalization...Second…because it is associated with pre-modern (primitive) societies…" (1987: 13). 
‘Mainstream’ Marxists have traditionally taken a functional approach to the analysis of political integration and 
modernization (cf. Connor, 1984).  
7 The cases of Catalonia and Scotland in Europe and Quebec in North America are paradigmatic in this 
respect. Michael Keating (1996) has done extensive research on the upsurge of the referred-to minority 
nations. In the case of Spain, the Basques and the Catalans see also Conversi (1997). For a collection of 
reflections on Quebec’s state and society, cf. Gagnon (1993).  
8 Robert Dahl’s position is in line with the views of Ernest Baker who also regarded political secessionism and 
authoritarianism as the two viable options in ethnocultural polyarchies. See Connor (1994: 124), and Linz 
(1973: 103-4).  
9 For Will Kymlicka ethnoterritorial accommodation would not constitute a stable political solution but a 
previous step to secession (1995). Linz’s views are, instead, that federalism can consolidate liberal 
democracy in multinational states (1997). On the ongoing debate concerning multiculturalism, minority rights, 
and the politics of recognition, cf. Kymlicka (1995), Taylor (1992) and Walzer (1997).  
10 Marxist thinkers would use concepts such as ‘class consciousness’ and ‘class struggle’. For both schools of 
thought, however, political integration and state building were the independent variables in a social analysis 
where culture and language were dependent categories (Deutsch, 1966).  
11 According to Walker Connor (1994), and due to the lack of an ethnonational origin of its own, the USA 
should not be considered as a nation.  
12 Let us remember that in 1947, the presidential candidate, Thomas Dewey, made a rather illustrative play on 
words: "...the city of New York is not a melting pot but a boiling pot". For a pluralist view which denies that 
Western development leads compulsorily to integrationist assimilation, cf. Esman (1977).  
13 Will Kymlicka considers that such cultures imply common memories, shared values, and even institutions 
and social common practices (1995).  
14 Recent ‘English only’ referenda held in South-Western states, where Spanish was spoken much earlier 
than the English-pioneers settled, seek to make compulsory a language exclusiveness precisely in areas 
where multicultural groups ‘threaten’ WASP hegemonic position.  
15 For liberals thinkers such as Michael Walzer this dichotomy is composed of ‘shadows’ (anonymity of being 
a US-American) and ‘lights’ (rooted-attachment of being Jewish-American, Afro-American, or say Irish-
American). Needless to say, the American civic value is conformed basically by WASP ethnic ‘lights’. As Yael 
Tamir (1993) has pointed out, these positions hardly disguised a liberal conception that reflects majority 
nationalism views in detriment to minority ethnic groups.  
16 In contemporary times, for example, the politicization of the Scottish ethnicity has been based upon a 
psychosocial perception of being ‘worse-off’ as compared to other areas of Britain, mainly the South-East. 
Since the 1960s, this feeling has been growing despite the higher allocation of British public expenditure in 
Scotland, and the existence of the Scottish Office, an institutionalized lobby with direct access to the political 
core of the United Kingdom. Cf. Moreno (1986).  
17 This is the case of South European countries. In Spain, for instance, three quarters of secondary education 
students consider the family to be the principal source of socialization and a locus where "...all important 
things in life are said to be orientations towards future life" (El País, Feb. 2, 1998).  
18 This is particularly relevant as regards major conurbations, regions, stateless nations, and small nation-
states. Greater London, the North East of England, Scotland, and the Republic of Ireland are instances of 
such communities in the context of the British Isles.  
19 Note that in the period of 3 years, access to the Internet in the USA has reached 60 million households, the 
same market penetration that took TV a period of 15 years. By the year 2005 it is estimated that Internet 
traffic will be higher than the use of the traditional telephone.  
20 Besides, the informal sector of the international economy counts on the financial connivance of some 
transnational networks for the ‘whitening’ of the profits of the illegal drug trade.  
21 Boeing, for instance, decided to drop its labeling as an ‘American corporation’. Note that many of the 
components for their planes are produced in a dozen different countries outside the USA. However, other 
companies take advantage of being a multinational consortium, as is the case of Airbus, the commercial arch-
rival of Boeing.  
22 William Greider (1997) holds the view that capital movements only take into account the potential level of 
profits disregarding geographical criteria. The recent economic crises in Japan and South East Asia seem to 
corroborate the axiom that the international financial markets are unstable by nature.  
23 According to George Soros (1997) "During the cycle capital expansion, money flows from the core 
countries to peripheral ones. Once the climate of confidence becomes shaky, capitals return to its places of 
origin" (El País, Dec. 23, 1997).  
24 In Spain, Franco’s Governments in the 1960s and 1970s followed the example during the period of 
industrial development, or desarrollismo. ‘Indicative planning’ related somewhat to the ideas of ‘cummulative 
imbalance’, ‘spatial polarization’ and ‘growth pole’ developed by Myrdal (1957) and Perroux (1964).  
25 A different issue is the location of central bureaucracies (or ‘eurocracies’, as is the case of Brussels) in their 
territories. Some of the officials of the central institutions cannot refrain from the perception that capital cities 
are the very representation of the nation-state.  
26 Other functional identities linked to various dimensions of social life, such as cultural forms, gender, religion 
and individual sociobiological conditions can also be interpreted as new forms of ‘resistance’ (Kilminster, 
1997).  
27 De-naturalizing is used here to mean the deprivation of the rights of citizenship within an established 
democratic polity.  
28 According to Manuel Castells (1997) ‘project identities’ do not seem to originate from the old identities of 
the civil societies in the Industrial Age, but from the development of current ‘resistance identities’ against the 
informational avalanche. This argument is rather circular as regards its territorial dimension. In the case of the 
USA sub-state spatial identities are not commensurable with the type of identities deeply rooted in the 
volkgeist of the diverse European peoples.  
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